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Abstract. Properties of trust are becoming widely studied in several
applications within the computational domain. On the contrary, nega-
tive trust attribution is less well-defined and related issues are yet to be
approached and resolved. We present a natural deduction calculus for
trust protocols and its negative forms, distrust and mistrust. The cal-
culus deals efficiently with forms of trust transitivity and negative trust
multiplication and we briefly illustrate some possible applications.
1 Introduction
In various areas of the computational sciences, characterizations of trust are
used to identify relevant, secure or preferred sources, channels and contents. For
trust interpreted as a first order relation between agents, propagation needs to
be considered [5, 3, 12, 11]:
Example 1 (Trust Transitivity). If Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Carol; should
Alice trust Carol?
This is undesirable in many security contexts. Solutions to this problem include
decentralised trust [1], bounded-transitivity in authorization contexts [4], and a
constraint by guarantors in [6]. In [20], trust is defined as a second-order property
of first-order relations (e.g. of communication) between agents. This is applied
in [19] to formulate SecureND, a proof-theoretic access control model with an
explicit trust function over resources: agents do not trust other agents, but the
information they receive from them. Informally, the trust function is defined as
follows:
Definition 1 (Trust). If Alice reads φ from Bob and φ is consistent with her
profile, Alice trusts φ and can write it.
SecureND resolves unintended transitive trust by requiring explicit localisation
of trusted messages in the agents’ profiles, similar to what suggested in [6].
Recently, research has started considering the different meanings of nega-
tive trust [15, 16, 10, 14, 22]. In the social sciences distrust is response to lack of
information [7, 8] and mistrust is former trust destroyed or healed [21]; the con-
textual account [14] present mistrust as misplaced trust, untrust as little trust
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and distrust as no trust. This approach abstracts from the reasons behind the
attribution of these evaluations, in favour of a purely quantitative approach.
Most of the remaining contributions do not distinguish mistrust from distrust.
Propagation for negative (first-order) trust is formulated as follows [13]:
Example 2 (Untrust Multiplication). If Alice does not trust Bob and Bob does
not trust Carol; should Alice trust Carol?
In this paper, we introduce (un)SecureND, an extension of the calculus in [19]
with rule-based definitions for negative trust over resources. Here and in the
following we use the term untrust as neutral with respect to its derivatives
mistrust for misplacement of trust, and distrust for betrayal. Our contribution
distinguishes among these two terms, based on the intentional characterization
offered in [18]. This calculus also resolves the problem of untrust multiplication.
Consider the following modified example:
Example 3 (Intentional Untrust Multiplication). Alice does not trust φ from
Bob: she believes he sends her intentionally false information. Bob does not
trust ¬φ from Carol: he believes she sends him intentionally false information.
Should Alice trust ¬φ from Carol?
The question is now better specified and we believe can be answered in the
affirmative, given Carol’s intention to deceive Bob, and Bob’s intention to de-
ceive Alice. The related epistemic action of distrust has the following intuitive
semantics:
Definition 2 (Distrust). If Alice reads φ from Bob and φ is inconsistent with
Alice’s profile, Alice distrust φ and writes ¬φ.
A distinct case for trust misplacement can be formulated as follows:
Example 4 (Unintentional Untrust Multiplication). Alice reads φ from Bob, false
in view of her current information: she believes she has unintentionally held false
information ¬φ. Bob has received φ from Carol, who can confirm it to Alice.
Should Alice trust φ from Carol?
The intuitive semantic meaning of this form of negated trust is as follows:
Definition 3 (Mistrust). If Alice reads φ from Bob, φ is inconsistent with
Alice’s profile and Alice wants to maintain consistency, then she either mistrusts
¬φ; else she refuses φ.
To accept or reject such contradicting information might depend on the number
and role of other agents available for confirmation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
natural deduction calculus (un)SecureND: it defines protocols by which agents
trust, mistrust or distrust information based on an intentional interpretation of
the truth of data transmission; we also briefly cover its meta-theoretical proper-
ties. In Section 3 we illustrate the restriction to untrust multiplication allowed
by this calculus and informally present a possible application to software man-
agement, extending the work in [2]. In Section 4 we survey further research
directions.
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2 (un)SecureND
(un)SecureND is a natural deduction calculus defining trust, mistrust and dis-
trust protocols. It formalizes a derivability relation on formulas from sets of
assumptions (contexts) as accessibility on resources issued by agents.
Definition 4 (Syntax of (un)SecureND).
S∼ := {A ≤ B ≤ . . . }
BFS := aS | φS1 → φS2 | φS1 ∧ φS2 | φS1 ∨ φS2 | ⊥
mode := Read(BFS) |Write(BFS) | Trust(BFS)
RESS := BFS | mode | ¬RESS
ΓS := {φS1 , . . . , φSn};
S is a set of subjects, with a partial order relation≤ over S×S: intuitively, S ≤ S′
means that subject S has higher security privileges than S′. The partial order
allows for branching in the hierarchy, so that e.g. A < B < C and A < B < D,
but C,D are not comparable. BFS is a set of boolean formulae inductively
defined by logical connectives and including ⊥ for the false. mode is a variable
for reading, writing and trusting formulae. Formulae and functions are closed
under negation. ` φA indicates a validly derivable resource φ issued by agent
A. Context ΓA formalises a set of formulae describing the profile for agent A,
under which some other resource can be accessed. A context can be extended by
a formula issued by the same agent, denoted by ΓA, φA; or it can be extended
by resources from a different agent, denoted by ΓA;φB and ΓA;ΓB .
Definition 5. An (un)SecureND-formula ΓA ` RESB says that under the pro-
file for user A, some resource from user B is validly accessed, given A ∼ B.
The calculus is based on two sets of rules. The access order to be applied to
these rules can be specified dependently on the application: for example, to
implement a downwards-only access protocol, the rules will hold only if A < B.
The operational rules to introduce and eliminate connectives on resources across
agents are given in Figure 1. The rule Atom establishes derivability of formulae
included in well-formed contexts and preserved under extension. We use the
abbreviation wf for a profile that preserves consistency construable by induction
from the empty profile. ∧-I says that if φA1 is derivable from profile ΓA and
φB2 is derivable from profile Γ
B , then their conjunction is derivable from the
joint profiles. By the elimination, each composing resource is derivable from
the combined profiles. ∨-I says that if a joint profile for users A,B can access
a formula φIi , then it can access the disjunction with any other formula. By
the elimination, each resource ψI derivable from each component φIi can also
be obtained by the extended profile. →-Introduction establishes the validity of
the Deduction Theorem; its elimination implements Modus Ponens. Negation is
defined (in the standard constructive way) by implication to the false.
In Figure 2 we present the access rules allowing a user’s profile to act on re-
sources available from another user. ¬-distribution implements a form of negation-
completeness: if a profile cannot access a resource from another agent, then it
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ΓA ` wf
Atom, for any b ∈ ΓB
ΓA;ΓB ` b
ΓA ` φA1 ΓB ` φB2 ∧-I
ΓA;ΓB ` φA1 ∧ φB2
ΓA;ΓB ` φA1 ∧ φB2 ∧-E
ΓA;ΓB ` φIi
ΓA;ΓB ` φIi ∨-I
ΓA;ΓB ` φA1 ∨ φB2
ΓA;ΓB ` φA1 ∨ φB2 φIi ` ψI ∨-E
ΓA;ΓB ` ψI
with I ∈ {A,B}, i ∈ {1, 2} in the above rules.
ΓA;φB1 ` φB2 →-I
ΓA ` φB1 → φB2
ΓA ` φB1 → φB2 ΓA ` φB1 →-E
ΓA;φB1 ` φB2
ΓA ` RESA → ⊥
bot
ΓA ` ¬RESA
Fig. 1. The System (un)SecureND: Operational Rules
can access its negation (although strong, this rule is essential to preserve con-
sistency). read says that from any well-formed profile A, formulae from a profile
B can be read (this will hold according to the required constraint on the order
relation mong agents). trust says that if a resource can be read and it preserves
consistency when added to the reading profile, then it can be trusted. write
says that a readable and trustable resource can be written. By DTrust, agent
A distrusts a resource φB if it induces contradiction when read from ΓA. Its
elimination uses →-introduction to induce write from the receiver profile of any
resource that follows distrusting operations. This trivially allows Write(¬φB)
when ¬Trust(φB) holds. By MTrust, agent A mistrusts resource φA ∈ ΓA if it
contradicts some received ψB ; then Cn(φA) is removed to accommodate ψB in
ΓA. Its elimination depends on a checking operation. By MTrust-E1, if at least
one C agent higher in the order than the sender B verifies the information φA
originally held by the receiver A, ψB is rejected; if the receiving agent is the
only one higher in the order relation with respect to the sender, the mistrust
operation reduces to a distrust one; for C < B < A, the receiver A looks for all
agents with higher reputation and/or privileges than sender B in order to check
for the content of the message ψ. By MTrust-E2, if for every agent C higher than
the sender B verifies the received contradictory information ψB , the receiver A
removes φA from her profile and trusts the new information.
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ΓA ` ¬mode(φB) ¬-distribution
ΓA ` mode(¬φB)
ΓA ` wf
read
ΓA ` Read(φB)
ΓA ` Read(φB) ΓA;φB ` wf
trust
ΓA ` Trust(φB)
ΓA ` Read(φB) ΓA ` Trust(φB)
write
ΓA `Write(φB)
ΓA ` wf ΓA ` Read(φB) → ⊥
DTrust-Intro
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φB)
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φB) ΓA ` ¬Trust(φB) → ψA
DTrust-Elim
ΓA `Write(ψA)
ΓA ` Read(ψB) → ⊥ Γ \ {φA} ` wf,∀φA ` Read(ψB) → ⊥
MTrust-Intro
Γ \ {φA};ψB ` ¬Trust(φA)
Γ \ {φA};ψB ` ¬Trust(φA) ∆C ` Read(ψB) → ⊥
MTrust-E1, for C < B
ΓA;∆C ` Trust(φA)
Γ \ {φA};ψB ` ¬Trust(φA) ∆C ;ψB ` wf
MTrust-E2, ∀C < B
Γ \ {φ}A;∆C ` Trust(ψB)
Fig. 2. The System (un)SecureND: Access Rules
2.1 Metatheory
The following standard meta-theoretical properties hold for (un)SecureND under
trust, all proofs are formulated by structural inductions on the derivation of the
second assumption (omitted for brevity).
Theorem 1 (Weakening A ∼ B). If ΓA ` Write(φA) and ΓA ` Trust(φB),
then ΓA;φB `Write(φA).
Theorem 2 (Contraction A ∼ B). If ΓA, φA;φB `Write(ψA), then ΓA, φA `
Write(ψA).
Theorem 3 (Exchange A ∼ B). If ΓA, φA;ψB ` ρA, then ΓA;ψB ;φA ` ρA.
The general form of the cut rule is as follows:
ΓA ` φB ∆B , φB ` ψB
Cut
ΓA;∆B ` ψB
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With A < B, it amounts to a cut downwards the order relation; with B < A
to one upwards: which one is allowed depends again on the application. If φB ≡
¬Trust(φB) and A < B, then the first premise is the result of a DTrust rule,
the second premise result from a MTrust rule, and the cut rule eliminates both;
if φB ≡ ¬Trust(φA), the first premise is obtained by a MTrust rule, the second
from a DTrust rule. In all these cases the conclusion of Cut will be an instance
of a Weakening rule. If ψB ≡ ¬Trust(ψB), then all cases reduce to instances of
Weakening on conclusions of a MTrust rule. Then untrust relations safely extend
the following from [19]:
Theorem 4 (Cut-Elimination Theorem). Any (un)SecureND derivation with
an instance of a Cut-rule can be transformed into another derivation with the
same end sequent iff appropriate trust-access is granted on any upward domina-
tion relation among agents.
3 Examples and Applications
In [19] trust transitivity from Example 1 is resolved by explicitly guaranteeing
consistency on every access to resources within the current profile. If Alice trusts
φ from Bob, and Bob trusts ψ from Carol, Alice also trusts (and eventually
writes) information ψ from Carol iff extending her profile ΓA with information
φB and ψC is explicit and preserves consistency.
In (un)SecureND, untrust multiplication from Example 2 is restricted to dis-
trust, i.e. all agents involved are actively trying to deceive their trustor:
ΓB ` wf ΓB ` Read(¬φC) → ⊥
ΓB ` ¬Trust(¬φC)
ΓB `Write(φB) ∆A ` Read(φB) → ⊥
∆A ` ¬Trust(φB) ∆A;¬φC ` wf
∆A ` Trust(¬φC)
∆A `Write(¬φC)
If Alice believes Bob is trying to deceive her with φ, and Bob believes Carol is
trying to deceive him with ¬φ, then Alice can trust ¬φ from Carol.
SecureND has been applied to the Minimally Trusted Install Problem in [2]:
determine the way to install a new package p in a system such that the minimal
amount of transitively trusted dependencies for p is satisfied. In (un)SecureND
we can resolve the negative counterpart of this problem. We offer here only an
informal explanation and leave a full formalization and the extension of the Coq
protocol from [2] to further research. Consider an installation profile ΓA, and a
software package ψ available from repository B for installation. DTrust-Intro can
be applied to return all packages that have unresolved conflicts in ΓA and as such
cannot be installed, including ψB . DTrust-Elim returns all packages that can be
installed under the current conflict with ψB . MTrust-Intro returns all packages
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already installed in ΓA that need to be removed for ΓA to install ψB safely.
MTrust-E1 returns all external packages that can be installed in ΓA preserving
the current installation and hence the conflict with ψB . MTrust-E2 returns all
packages that can be safely installed in ΓA preserving the installation of ψB .
4 Conclusions
(Un)trust relations reveal relevant problems for privacy and security. Attack-
ers can exploit negative trust to induce unconstrained positive information; in-
tentional transmission of true data can be conceived as a strategy to win the
trustor’s confidence for future attacks, with trustworthiness evaluation based
on records of high rate of false alarms (or low records of true alarms). Untrust
multiplication can generate unintended accesses and operations. An evaluation
based on intentionality criteria can offer a sensibly better solution in many cases
if combined with a quantitative and computationally feasible approach. We have
presented a calculus for access control protocols with negative trust, modelled
formally as functions on resources issued by agents. This language qualifies trust
transitivity under consistency constraints and limits untrust multiplication to
intentional cases of false data transmission. It also allows revision of false con-
tent held within an agent’s profile in the form of mistrust. Next stages of this
research will focus on defining structural weakenings of the calculus and the
development of applications.
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